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Abstraet 
.This study links a multidimensional measure of compensation strategy to :Miles and Snows 
(l978) business strategies, and examines their interactive impact on firm performance. The results 
reported here indicate that a more mechanistic compensation strategy makes a greater contribution 
to firm performance among defenders, while a more organic compensation strategy makes a greater 
contribution to firm performance among prospectors. 
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There has been an increasing awareness in human resource management that organizational 
context is an important determinant of personnel practices and their effectiveness (e.g., Jackson, 
Schuler. & Rivero, 1989; Guthrie & Olían, 1991). One area that has received much attention is the 
compensation system. Authors such as Kerr (1985) , Milkovich (1988), Balkin and Gomez-Mejia 
(1984, 1990), Welboume & Gomez-Mejia (1995) among others, have argued that the reward 
structure should serve as an essential integrating mechanism through which the efforts of individuals 
are directed toward the achievement of a firm's strategic objectives. The conceptual root underlying 
most of this research is that effectiveness in strategy implementation depends significantly on the 
existence of a match between compensation strategies and organization strategies. If different 
compensation strategies are needed for the effective implementation oforganizational strategies, then 
it follows that a systematic matching ofcompensation and organizational strategies will yield superior 
firm performance (e. g. , Balkin & Gomez-Mejia, 1990; Gomez- Mejia & Balkin, 1992; Wallace, 
1987; Stroh, Brett, Baumann, & Reilly, 1996). 
While firm performance is posited as the ultimate dependent variable, extant research has 
focused on the more intermediate task ofascertaining the degree to which different reward system 
profiles reflect variations in organizational strategies (e.g., Broderick, 1986; Kerr, 1985) . In two 
previous studies, Balkin and Gomez-Mejia (1967, 1990) indirectIy dealt with the firm performance 
implications of a compensation-organization strategy match. These authors found that there are 
consistent and recurrent patterns ofcompensation strategies (in terms of pay package design, market 
positioning, and pay policy choices) associated with a firm's overarching business strategies, and that 
the greater the deviation from the 11 ideal 11 compensation pattern for a particular organizational 
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strategy, the less effective the firm's reward system is perceived to be. In a later study, Gomez-Mejia 
(1992) found that degree of diversification and compensation strategies interactively predicted firm 
performance. Along similar Unes, Gerhart and Milkovich (1990) report that firms relying on variable 
compensation strategies (bonus and long-term income) for mid to upper level managers tend to be 
more profitable than those which rely on fixed payo 
Unfortunately, prior research on these issues focuses almost exclusively on the performance 
of large diversified firms rather than business units. The study reported here tries to fill this gap by 
linking a multifaceted measure of compensation strategy to the business strategy typology developed 
by Miles and Snow (1978), and then tests for their interactive influence on firm performance as a 
dependent variable. The Miles and Snow (1978) business strategy typology was chosen because (a) 
it " ...seems to have the clearest implications for compensation system differences" (Carroll, 1987: 
350); (b) it is widely known and has been extensively used to study a variety of organizational 
phenomena(e.g., .Hambriek, MacMillan, & Barbarosa, 1983; Adam, 1983; Segev, 1989), ineluding 
compensation (Broderick, 1986; Miles & Snow, 1984); and (e) there is strong empirieal support for 
its reliability and validity (Shortell & Zajae, 1990). The firm's compensation strategies and lts 
business strategies (using the Miles & Snow's framework) were subjectively assessed while firm 
performance was independently calculated from archiva! data, redueing the possibility that obtained 
results are artifactual in nature. 
Compensation choiees that are purported to have strategie signifieance are discussed first. 
This provides the background material for making differential predietions coneerning the extent to 
which a particular compensation pattem makes a greater contribution to firm performance as a 
function ofMiles and Snow's (1978) business strategies. Next, the hypothesized interactive impact 
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ofcompensation and business strategies on firm performance is tested in a sample of 112 single and 
dominant product firms. Overall, empirical results support the notion that a match between 
organizational and compensation strategies has a salutary effect on firm performance. The paper 
conc1udes with a diseussion of the theoretical and applied implications of this research for 
condensation in particular and human resource management praetices in general. 
STRATEGIC COMPENSATION CHOICES AND PATTERNS 
Numerous compensation choices have been identified in the strategy and personnelliterature 
that are useful in understanding and anaIyzing compensation phenomena from a strategic perspective. 
Based on an extensive review of the literature. Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) suggest that 
compensation ehoices can be broadly grouped in terms ofbasis for pay (such as job held vs. individual 
characteristies, Wallace, 1991; seniority vs. performance, Broderick, 1986; internal vs. external 
equity. Lawler, 1990); system design (such as incentives as a proportion oftotal pay, SaIscheider, 
1981; pay level vs. market, Ehrenberg & Milkovich, 1987); and administrative framework (sueh as 
centralization vs. decentralization ofpay decisions. Hambrick & Snow, 1989; and open vs. secret pay, 
Lawler, 1983). 
In another literature review, Ehrenberg and Milkovich (1987) note that: 
~, ... disentangling the effects of each of these dimensions will be a diffieult and perhaps 
unfeasible task. It is possible that a firm's economic performance is affected by its 
compensation strategy in toto. If this is the case, then we need to examine a firm's behavior 
on these policy dimensions simultaneously rather than treating each as a diserete decision. 
Empirically, a firm's compensation strategy needs to be measured as a set of interrelated 
dimensions" (p. 91) and" ... future research needs to examine a firm's policy about the various 
dimensions ofcompensation policy simultaneously rather than focusing on one poliey to the 
exclusion of others. Empirically, a firm's compensation strategy needs to be measured as a 
set ofinterrelated dimensions" (p. 102). 
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There is increasing evidence that Ehrenberg and Milkovich (1987) are right, namely that firms 
seldom make these strategic compensation choices in isolation, but as an interrelated set of decisions 
evolving into common patterns or themes. This means that, in general, organizations tend to adopt 
multiple pay strategies that are internally consistent. This literature, appearing since Ehrenberg and 
Milkovich's (1987) review, is discussed next. 
Gomez-Mejia and Welbourne (1988) examined 18 published papers on compensation 
strategies appearing prior to 1988. Because most ofthese were conceptual in nature or based on case 
studies (e.g., Salter, 1973; Miles & Snow, 1984), it was not feasible to use data reduction techniques 
(e.g., meta-anaIysis) to draw underlying patterns. Alternatively, Gomez-Mejia and Welbourne (1988) 
used a heuristic method to sort and aggregate strategic compensation dimensions postulated by 
various authors into two major groupings, designated as mechanistic and organic, whereby firms 
adopting a particular compensation strategy within each of these patterns also tend to make other 
related pay choices germane to that pattern. The mechanistic pattern is characterized by formalized 
rules and procedures that routinize pay decisions and that are applied uniformIy across the entire 
organization. Strategic compensation choices associated with this pattern incIude: job held rather 
than personal skills as basis for payment; base salary aboye market; individual appraisals; seniority 
contingent pay and other pay policies designed to "Iock" employees into the firm, making it difficult 
for tbem to find comparable compensation packages elsewhere. These firms are more likely to 
develop and carefuIly implement traditional job evaluation-procedures in order to attain "internal 
equity" between jobs and grade levels. This encourages transfers within the internallabor market, 
resulting in longer tenure, a "grown from within" work force, and an expectation of 
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intraorgamzational upward mobility overtime. The firm's culture bestows prestige and pecuniary 
rewards to individuals as they move up the corporate Iadder. Risk sharing is minimal (with a pay mix 
that emphasized fixed compensation) and the system for administering rewards is typified by 
centralization, secrecy, lack ofparticipation, and bureaucratic procedures. 
The orgame pattern identified by Gomez-Mejia and Welbourne (1988) is associated with 
compensation strategies that are inherently flexible and fluid in nature, designed to be responsive to 
varying conditions, contingencies, and individual situations. Firms exhibiting this pattern reward for 
skills (rather than job held) , individual and group performance (rather than seniority) , risk sharing 
and market value of individuals (rather than worth of jobs assessed apriori via job evaluation 
procedures and salary surveys). There is greater reliance on non~recurrent bonuses and deferred 
income. The reward system is more egalitarian in nature. The administrative apparatus tends to be 
deeentralized, with greater pay openness and employee participation, and a minimum of rules, 
procedures, and bureaucratic red tape. 
An empirical compensation profile of 192 firms in a study by Balkin and Gomez-Mejia (1990) 
found support for the two major strategic pay patterns discussed aboye, a more mechanistic pattern 
at one end (e.g., paying for the job, not the individual, a pay mix consisting primarily ofsalary and 
benefits; low risk sharing; centralization; and secrecy) and a more organic pattern at the other end 
(e.g., paying for the individual not the job; a higher proportion of Itat risk" compensation; 
decentralization; and openness). More recentIy, and building upon the previous studies reviewed 
aboye, Gomez-Mejia (1992) found additional support in a sample of243 manufacturing firms for the 
existence oftwo major compensation patterns. The first pattern is labeled as algorithmic because "the 
main emphasis is on the use ofmechanistic, predetermined, standardized, repetitive procedures, with 
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minimal attention to mitigating circumstances, exceptions to the rule, and external contingency 
factors." The second pattern is labeled as experiential "because the firm's compensation strategies are 
flexible and adaptive so that these can be molded to respond to changing circumstances, factors 
mediating their effectiveness, sudden environmental shifts, and fluid organizational structures." 
Characteristics ofthe algorithmic and experiential compensation patterns in terms ofbasis for 
pay, design issues and administrative framework are summarized in Figure 1. The present study uses 
the algorithmic-experiential compensation continuum and corresponding measurement instrument (see 
Appendix) developed by Gomez-Mejia (1992). The psychometric properties of this scale in the 
context of the present sample are described in the results section. Two hypotheses are tested 
concerning the extent to which a firm's performance is a function of the interaction between its 
relative position on the algorithmic-experiential continuum and its strategic orientation using Miles 
and Snow's (1978) scheme. 
BUSINESS STRATEGY, COMPENSATION STRATEGY, AND FIRl\f PERFORMANCE 
A number of researchers have argued that pay strategies should differ according to the well 
known framework ofMiles and Snow (1978). Hambrick and Snow (1989), Miles and Snow (1984), 
Carroll (1987), Wallace (1987, 1991), and Broderick (1986), among others, have advanced the notion 
that the appropriateness of different compensation strategies depend on the extent to which the 
business follows a prospector, defender or analyzer strategy. 
Prospectors pursue a growth strategy by capitalizing on environmental opportunities, 
searching for new product/market innovations, risk taking, experimenting with potenti al responses 
to emerging environmental trends, and the creation ofchange/uncertainty to which competitors must 
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respond (Miles & Snow, 1984). The prospector strategy is Ilbest implemented through an organic 
or loose, non-formalized organization that emphasizes decentralization of decision making and lateral 
communication" (Carroll, 1987: 345). Thus, prospectors tend to have organic structures, fluid and 
complex tasks. and unstable environments with a rapid rate of change (Miles & Snow, 1978). 
Flexibility is very important to firms following this strategy. This means that "...there is less 
formalization and centralization... managers are freer to develop policies fitting their unique 
situations" (Wallace, 1987:176). 
A compensation strategy that is more experiential in nature is most likely to meet the needs 
ofprospectors (see Figure 1) . Conceptual work by Miles and Snow (1984), Wallace (1987), Carroll 
(1987), Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) and a descriptive survey by Broderick (1986) indicate that 
the following characteristics ofthe pay system are purported to be most appropriate for prospectors: 
a high performance orientation, a low emphasis on seniority, externa! competitiveness rather than 
internal consistency, total compensation heavily oriented toward incentives, decentralization, long­
tern income, high risk sharing, greater reliance on pecuniary rewards, open communication, and 
extensive employee participation. 
At the opposite end, a more algorithmic compensation strategy is purported to be more 
appropriate for defenders (see Figure 1). Defenders are characterized by narrow and relatively stable 
product market domains, employee specialization, stable technology and methods ofoperation, an 
emphasis on efficiency, a placid environment, and a mechanistic organizational structure. Unlike 
prospectors which devote themselves to the "entrepreneurial" task, defenders attend primarily to the 
"engineering" task (Hambrick, 1983). Complimentary compensation strategies for defenders 
inc1ude, according to Miles and Snow (1984:49), "an onentation to position in the hierarchy, internal 
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consistency, a total compensation heavily oriented toward cash (versus long-term income such as 
stock offerings) , formaVextensive planning, and process oriented appraisals." Carroll (1987) adds 
I . the following characteristics wruch are also part of algorithmic compensation pattern: Iower pay
, 
leve! relative to market, less use ofdeferred compensation, more emphasis on short ron performance, 
individual based appraisals and rewards. A survey by Broderick (1986) supports the aboye 
contentions. 
A built-in notion in the aboye arguments is that "successful firms display a consistent 
strategy... and that compensation should match the organization's business strategies'l (Miles & Snow, 
1984: 40). The firm performance implication oftrus proposition is that congroent combinations of 
pay strategies and business strategies are purported to lead to higher performance (see Figure 2). 
In the words of Donaldson (1987: 10): flFit causes higher performance and misfit causes Iower 
performance. ti 
Unfortunately, the consequences ofpay fit discussed in the previous paragraph have not been 
examined. To do so is crucial because, as argued by Milkovich (1988: 264), " ... the most 
fundamental ofall the tenets on wruch a strategic perspective on compensation is based is the belief 
that fitting compensation systems to environmentaI and organizational conditions [read business 
strategy] makes a difference; that systematic variation in compensation systems is more than random 
noise; that making compensation policies and practices contingent on organizational and 
enwonmental conditions [read business strategy] has sorne desired effects on ... the performance of 
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organizations." Thus, the need for the following hypotheses1: 
Hypothesis 1: An experiential compensation strategy makes a greater contribution to firm 
performance among prospectors. 
Hypothesis 2: An algorithmic compensation strategy makes a greater contribution to firm 
performance among defenders. 
METROD 
5arnp)e 
The Miles and Snow (1978) strategic orientations are only relevant for business level 
strategies. ConsequentIy, they cannot be meaningfully used to study the strategies ofdiversified firms 
because each business unít under a corporate umbrella is likely to pursue its own uníque strategy 
(Zahra & Pearce, 1990). 
In other words, as a corporation's products become more heterogeneous, operating in diverse 
industries, each business unit tends to make its own strategic decisions in dependent of the 
1In the present study, we do not examine the potential interactive effect ofcompensation 
strategies and the analyzer business strategy (which exhibit characteristics ofboth prospectors and 
defenders) on firm performance. This decision was made for a number ofrelated reasons. Miles 
& Snow (1984) and others (e.g., Broderick, 1986) suggest that analyzers should have a mix of 
seniority and performance based compensation, internal consistency and external competitiveness 
etc. What the appropriate mix should be is ambiguous and arbitrary and there are no c1ear 
theoretical directives to arrive at one. Consequently, it is difficult to operationally define with any 
acceptable degree ofreliability and confidence what the most appropriate compensation strategy 
mix should look like for analyzers. 
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corporation so that it may be possible (indeed desirable in many cases) for various units under the 
same corporate umbrella to be defenders, prospectors or analyzers (see Snow & Hrebiniak, 1980). 
¡ 
, . 	 The main strategic concem of diversified product firms is the mix of businesses the corporation 
should hold, and decisions concerning acquisition, divestment, diversification, and flow of funds 
(Ramanujan & Varadarajan, 1989). The Miles and Snow's framework (Miles & Snow, 1978) is most 
appropriate for firms that formulate multi-functional strategies for businesses that operate in a single 
product or dominant product markets (Segev, 1989). For this reason, only single product or 
dominant product firms were used in this study to test the hypothesized relationships. 
The sample offirms used for this study consists of 112 firms that met the well known criterion 
established by Rumelt (1974, 1986) for single product (companies that obtain 95 percent or more of 
their revenue from a single product domain) and dominant product (firms that derive between 70 and 
94 percent oftheir revenues from a single product domain). The top human resource management 
executive from each firm responsible for compensation completed a survey on the company's pay 
strategies (see Appendix) and the business' strategic orlentation using Miles and Snow's (1978) 
scheme. Firm performance data was obtained from Compustat, an archival source. The operational 
measures are described in more detail below. 
Algoritbmjc - Experiential Compensatjan Pattero 
The 14 scales (see Appendix A) measuring various dimensions ofthe compensation strategy 
profile shown in Figure 1 were factor analyzed using a principal component procedure. The 
intercorrelation matrix ofall 14 scales and factor analytic results are shown in Table 2. As can be 
seen at the foot ofthat table, al! scales load highly on a single factor. Only one factor emerged with 
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an Eigenvalue exeeeding 1.0. A positive factor loading indicates that a hlgh seore on that seale 
represents a more experiential orientation, while a negative factor loading means that a high score on 
that scaIe represents a more algorithmie orientation2• 
A composite factor score was caleulated for each ofthe 112 firms by multiplying its score for 
each of the 14 scaIes by the respective factor loading, summing across the weighed scales and 
dividing the resulting total by 14. Therefore, a firm scoring higher on the composite is more 
experiential in nature, while a firm scoring lower on the composite exhibits a more algorithmic 
orientation in its pay strategies. In other words, the resulting composite provides a measure of a 
firm's compensation strategies in toto. 
Miles and Snow Business Strategies 
The actual items used to measure the extent to whieh a firm follows a defender or a 
prospector strategy represents a slight1y simplified version of Miles and Snow's (see Snow & 
Hrebiniak, 1980) original seaIes. Participants were asked to indicate on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 
a 5 (strongly agree) response format the extent to whieh they concur that the following descriptors 
ofstrategy types apply to their firm 3: 
'2The reader should keep in mind that the labels used to describe the algorithmic­
experiential compensation pattern in Figure 1 provide a dichotomous description (e.g., job vs. 
individual) for the sake of clarity in presentation, but the actual seaIes used (see Appendix for 
scaIes and Table 5 for descriptive statistics) are continuous in nature, so that a firm can be higher 
or lower on any particular dimension as well as the composite pay strategy score. 
3Traditionally business poliey researehers have tended to operationalize Miles & Snow's 
(1978) strategic orientations as a nominal variable. However, Miles and Snow's (1978) note that 
categories ofprospectors, defenders and anaIyzers represent "pure types." The eontinuous 
approach being taken in this study captures the extent to whlch a firm shares charaeteristics 
associated with each of these pure types ( for a similar approach, see Gupta & Govindarajan, 
1984). 
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Defenders. Firm has a narrow and relatively stable product market domain. Firm seldom needs 
to make major adjustments in technology. structure or methods ofoperation. Emphasis is on 
efficiency. Other characteristics of defenders include a limited product line; single, capital 
intensive technology; a functional structure, and skills in production efficiency, process 
engineering. and cost controL 
Prospectors. Firm tries to be a tlfirst mover" in new product and market areas, even if sorne 
of its efforts faiL There is strong concern for product and market innovation. Other 
characteristics include a diverse product line~ multiple technologies; a product or divisionalized 
structure; and skills in product research and development, market research. and development 
engineering. 
Analyzers. This type of organization attempts to maintain a stable, limited Une of products 
or services, while at the same time moving out quick1y to follow a carefully selected set of the 
more promising new developments in the industry. The organization is seldom Itfirst in l ' with 
new products or services but it is often a fast follower. 
Firm Performance 
The firm performance measure consisted of a quartile membership integer ranging from 1 for 
companies that were in the bottom 25 percent ofthe performance distribution to 4 for companies that 
were in the upper quartile ofthe performance distribution. AH firms were assigned to one ofthe four 
ranks prior to the survey mailing, and the color of the paper was varied to identify the appropriate 
performance cohort for each respondent. This procedure allowed the researcher to link survey data 
to an independent externa! firm performance measure while at the same time preserve the anonymity 
ofthe respondent. 
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The index used to assign firms into one ofthe performance quartiles was an average of the 
standardized values of four widely used measures of firm performance for the five years preceding 
the survey: earnings per share, return on investment, return on conunon stock):, and annual percent 
change in a firm's market value. In a review of44 studies dealing with firm performance issues during 
a twenty year period, Hofer (1983) reports that these are among the most frequentIy used 
performance measures. 
A1l four components ofthe average performance index used to rank firms were obtained from 
Compustat, an archival source. Use of multiple indicators of firm performance provides a more 
reliable assessment (see Weiner & Mahoney, 1981); these measures are also correlated, allloading 
on a single factor (Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1991), providing statistical support for their aggregation 
into a conunon indexo The correlation between the quartile performance rankings and the raw scores 
on the performance composite was .91, indicating that liule information was lost by assigning firms 
to these four groups. 
Control Variables 
Four control variables were also included in the anaIysis because these may be correlates of 
a firm's business and compensation strategies, as well as financiaI performance. These control 
variables included as Part ofthe survey are: (a) R&D intensity measured as expenditures in research 
and development as a proportion of total operating expenditures (Milkovich, Gerhart, & Hannon, 
1991); (b) firm size, measured as a composite of standardized values of number of employees and 
dollar sales (Martell, Carroll, & Gupta, 1992; Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996) ; (c) tife cycle, 
measured as IIzero" for firms at the growth stage and lIone" for firms at the maintenance stage, using 
the operational indicators oflife cyc1e stage applied in previous research by Hambrick (1981, 1983), 
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Hofer (1975), and BaIkin and Gomez-Mejia (1984) ; and (d) proportion ofIabor costs to total costs 
(Ehrenberg & Smith, 1988). 
Analysis 
A hierarchical moderated regression procedure (Cohen & Cohen, 1983) was used to ascertain 
the interactive effect of compensation strategy (Comps) and business strategy (using the Miles & 
Snow framework) on firm perfonnance. Variables were entered in three steps: control variables (Le., 
R&D intensity, firm size, life cycle, and proportion of labor costs to total costs); main effects 
(defender, prospector, analyzer, and compensation strategy or Comps) ; and interaction tenns for 
prospector x Comps (Hypothesis 1) and defender x Comps (Hypothesis 2). 
By entering the cross product tenns last, a significant effect for an interaction tenn would 
indicate that a particular business strategy moderates the relationship between compensation strategy 
and firm perfonnance. More specifical1y, ifthe unstandardized regression coefficient (B) is positive 
and significant for "prospector x Comps" one would conclude that, controlling for other factors, the 
positive impact of a more experiential pay strategy on firm performance is greater for companies that 
are higher on the prospector measure (supporting Hypothesis 1). 
Altematively, a negative and statistically significant B for "defenders x Comps" indicates that, 
controlling for other factors, a more algorithmic compensation strategy makes a greater contribution 
to firm performance among finns that have a stronger defender orientation (supporting hypothesis 
2). 
RESULTS 
The intercorrelation matrix, incIuding means and standard deviations for aH variables, appears 
in Table 3; Table 4 surnmarizes the regression equations testing the interactive effect ofMiles and 
¡Ii 
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Snow dimensions and compensation strategy (Comps) on firm performance. 
As can be seen in Table 4, the regression coefficient for "defender x Comps" is negative and 
statistically significant (beta = .73, P :5 .01) . This confirms that a more algorithmic compensation 
strategy makes a greater contribution to firm performance among businesses that follow a defender 
strategy (supporting Hypothesis 1). On the other hand, the cross-product regression coefficients for 
"prospector x Comps" is positive and statistically significant (beta = .66, P :5 .05) indicating that a 
more experiential compensation strategy makes a greater contribution to firm performance 
among prospectors (supporting Hypothesis 2). 
The .ill.2 in Table 4 is relatively small when the interaction terms are entered ¡nto the regression 
equation (t:.R2-.07). Not surprisingly. this indicates that firm performance is responsive to many 
factors other than compensation. However, the effects are large enough to have practical significance 
and fall 'Within the typical range of explained variance found in executive compensation research (see 
reviews by Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; Gomez-Mejia & Welboume, 1989). To put these results 
into perspective, Zajac and Shortell (1989) could only account for 10 percent ofthe variance in 
profitability differences for firms in their sample using Miles and Snow's framework and seven 
independent variables. The practical significance of the findings reported here in terms of 
compensation - organization strategy fit on firm performance is addressed in Table 6 and will be 
revisÍted shortly. 
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics for each of the compensation strategy scales and the 
compensation strategy composite broken down by defenders and prospectors. 1t is the numerical 
counterpart of Figure 1. Consistent with expectations and earlier research by Broderick (1986), 
defenders score higher onjob emphasis, individual performance focus, lead market policy. and 
17 
pay secrecy. Prospectors, on the other hand, score higher than defenders on performance emphasis. 
long term orientation, risk sharing, egalitarianism, incentives, multiple rewards/high frequency. 
I • pecuniary emphasis, decentralized pay decisions, and employee participation. The compensation 
strategy composite for prospectors averaged 1.19 versus an average of .79 for defenders (P :S .01). 
indicating a more experiential pay orientation for the former. 
Table 6 provides descriptive statistics to show the practical effect of a compensation­
organization strategy match on finn performance. The entries in the matrix represent the average and 
standard deviation scores of the dependent variable (Le., firm performance quartile) for firms 
following a predominantly algorithmic (those below the median on Conps) or experiential (those 
above the median on Comps) compensation strategy nested within defenders and prospector groups. 
As can be seen moving down the rows in Table 6, prospectors that rely on a more algorithmic 
compensation strategy are, on average, almost one and a halfquartile lower on firm performance than 
prospectors which rely on a more experientiaI compensation strategy (5< = 1. 85 vs. 5< = 3. 3 O, P 
:S . O 1) . Among defenders the situation is reversed. Defenders relying on a more algorithmic 
compensation strategy are, on average, almost half a quartile higher on firm performance than 
defenders which rely on a more experientiaI compensation strategy (5< = 2.41 vs. 5< = 1.93, P:S .01). 
Moving across columns in Table 6, firms that rely on a more algorithmic compensation 
strategy are, on average, more than half a quartile higher on firm performance ir they exhibit a 
defendervis-a-vis a prospector orientation (5< =2.41 vs. 5< = 1.85, P:S .01). The reverse is true for 
firms following a predominantIy experientiaI compensation strategy, with those that are prospectors 
showing, on average, one and a half performance quartile higher than those designated as defenders 
(5< = 3.30 vs. 5< = 1.93, P :S .01). 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this study has been to examine the relationship between organizationaI and 
pay strategies, and their interactive effect on firm performance. Consistent with previous research, 
the results reported here indicate that compensation strategies do vary according to Miles and Snow's 
business strategies. Furthermore, the factor anaIytic findings reported here confirm the heuristic 
conclusions of earlier research (e.g., Gomez-Mejia & Welbourne, 1988; BaIkin & Gomez-Mejia, 
1990) that there are two major patterns of strategic compensation choices that tend to "hang 
together" -- a more algorithmic pattern at one end and a more experiential pattern at the other end. 
Most importantly, our results support the notion that firm performance is a positive function 
of the degree to which compensation strategies reinforce or match organizational strategies. 
specificaIly, an algorithmic compensation pattern (with its emphasis on formalized rules and 
procedures and a more mechanistic orientation) tends to make a greater contribution to firm 
performance among businesses that try to maintain secure positions in relatively stable product or 
service areas (i.e., defenders). An experiential compensation pattern (designed to be more responsive 
to varying conditions, contingencies, and individual situations) tends to make a greater-contribution 
to firm performance for entrepreneurial companies actively searching for new products and markets, 
not afraid of pursuing opportunities both within and outside existing areas of expertise (i.e., 
prospectors). 
Reward systems represent one of the most important and prominent features oforganizations. 
Numerous papers have been published on the subject across a wide variety of disciplines such as 
finance (e.g., Baker, Jensen, & Murphy, 1988), sociology (e.g., ABen, 1961), economics (e.g., 
Abowd, 1990), marketing (e.g., Stanton & Buskirk, 1987), strategic management (e.g., Galbraith & 
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Menill, 1991), human resource management (Balkin & Gomez~Mejia, 1984), and industrial relations 
(e.g., Ehrenberg & Milkovich, 1987). A common theme in tbis diverse literature is that reward 
I • systems exert a powerful signalling effect on a firm by conveying to employees what the organization 
I 
considers to be most critical. 
¡ • 
Within tbis larger context, tbis study has several key behavioral implications in terms offirm 
performance. First, organizational members tend to behave in accordance to what they perceive leads 
to rewards they value (see Vroom, 1964; Hinkin, Podsakoff, & Schriesheim, 1987). Thus, a firm that 
is able to tie valued rewards to the behaviors it needs to effectively implement organizational 
strategies is more likely to find that the reward system is a postive contributor to firm performance. 
Next, the culture or climate ofan organization is deeply affected by its reward structure (Hansen & 
Wenerfelt, 1989). To the extent that compensation strategies can influence the degree to wruch a firn 
is viewed as having a bureaucratic onented culture, an entrepreneurial culture, a competence based 
culture, or a political culture (see Lawler, 1990) and the cultural norms being reinforced are attuned 
to the firm's strategic orientation, one would expect a positive contribution of the reward system to 
firm performance. Last 1 y, the reward system of a firm is one of the most prominent factors that 
reinforce and define the organization's structure (Tosi, Rizzo, & Carroll, 1996) For instance, it can 
help define the status hierarchy, the most desirable career ladders, the nature of interunit relations, 
and local rationality (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992). Thus, compensation strategies may contribute 
to firm performance by supporting those structural elements that need to be in sync with the firm's 
overall strategic orientation. 
The Miles and Snow's framework is sufficientIy rich that it can provide an avenue for much 
additional research on how the effectiveness of a firm's compensation strategy is affected by 
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contextual factors. Important issues that should be exanined in future research are discussed next. 
A crucial concem for organizations attempting to tailor unique compensation strategies for 
different employee groups, management levels, and subunits is how to balance their simultaneous 
need for consistency and contingency in the reward systen. To the extent that organizational 
boundaries are permeable (e.g., with substantial interdependence across units, extensive 
communication flows, and close physical proximity) this dilemma may present problems in terms of 
perceived inequities, and associated dysfunctions such as intense conflict, lack ofcoordination, and 
parochialism. Coombs and Gomez-Mejia (1991) ofien find this to be the case among high technology 
firms with spedal compensation programs for R&D employees, engendering resentment among other 
groups who feel disenfranchised such as manufacturing engineers. Carroll (1988) refers to this 
"balancing act" as one of the most significant challenges in contingency based compensation 
programs, yet very Httle if any research has been conducted on the topic. Prospectors are most 
likely to be caught in the paradox ofconsistency versus contingency because they rely on experientiaI 
pay stategies operating within a matrix type orgaruzation, with Httle buffering across employee 
groups. This is unlike a defender which tends to be organized along rigid functional structures with 
extensive buffering between groups of specialized employees (see Hambrick & Snow, 1989), and 
relying on more algorithmic pay strategies. 
A second issue to be examined longitudinally is how alignment of pay and organizational 
strategies can be maintained as firms modify and adjust their strategies overtime. Adaptive 
compensation decisions made today tend to harden and become aspects oftomorrow's compensation 
strategies. In other words, because alignment is a dynamic process it is quite possible that at any 
given point in time the reward structure constrains the firm's business strategies, and vice versa. This 
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raises the specter that functional fit between pay and business strategies in the short run could be 
dysfunctional in the long runo For instance, a defender type firm attempting to become more 
prospector oriented may find much resistance from employees accustomed to the predictability of an 
algorithmic compensation strategy. 
Third, compensation is on1y one aspect ofhuman resource management (HR.M) strategy, and 
as such should be part ofan integrated human resources management system. Indeed, :Miles & Snow 
(1984) made specific predictions concerning various subfunctional HRM, strategies purported to be 
most appropriate for defenders and prospectors. These span such areas as recruitment", selection, 
placement, human resource planning, training and development, and performance appraisal (see 
:Miles & Snow, 1984). To our knowledge, the linkages between these subfunctional HRM strategies 
and :Miles and Snow's business strategies remain unexplored, either singularly or in toto. Likewise, 
the relationship between compensation and other subfunctional HRM strategies, and their interactive 
effect on firm performance as a function of a firm's defender or prospector orientation have yet to be 
studied. 
Fourth, the present study has been exclusively focused on between group differences (Le., 
defenders and prospectors) in compensation strategies and performance, ignoring witbin group 
differences. It is important to keep in mind, however, that Miles and Snow's conceptualization of 
business strategy may be too simplistic to capture the richness and nuances oforganizationallife that 
molds the reward system over time. In other words, "each firm has its own unique history and 
tradition, cultural norms, and sociotechnical and environmental forces that shape the framework 
within which the compensation system must operatell (Gomez-Mejia & Welbourne, 1988: 186). 
Future work in tbis area would benefit from qualitative studies that show how idiosyncratic firm 
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characteristics witbin the defender and prospector groups affect compensation strategies and their 
effectiveness. 
Lastly, sorne studies suggest that there is a contingent relationsbip between business 
strategy and managerial characteristics, and that an appropriate match enhances the effectiveness 
ofstrategy implementation (e.g., Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984). A study by Guthrie and Olian (1991) 
showed that organizationaI contexual features (environmentaI stability, straegy, firm performance, 
and size) are related to the background characteristics ofgeneral managers selected to head business 
units. Gupta and Govindarajan (1984) report that personaIity characteristics of the general manager 
affect the quality of strategy implementation. Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1989) found that the 
effectiveness ofcompensation the effectiveness ofcompensation strategies is mediated by personality 
characteristics ofthose affected (namely, willingness to take risks and tolerance for ambiguity). It 
would be interesting to integrate this research stream with the research reported here. For instance, 
one could examine managerial and employee characteristics that are more algorithmic or experiential 
compensation congruent with an strategy, and how a fitJmisfit between the two affects 
business strategy implementation. 
There are a number of methodologicallimitations to tbis study worth mentioning; most of 
these are intractable problems in fieId research of this nature. Fírst, wbile method variance ís 
minimiized in tbis study because the firm performance indices and the strategy measures were 
obtained Compustat and a survey) , measures were obtained independently from each other (Le., 
Compustat and a survey), it can be eliminated entirely. For example, greater intercorrelation among 
the pay choice dimensions may be obtained vía a survey approach (increasing the likelihood offinding 
a cornmon underIying factor) than there is in the real world due to perceptual and affective cognitions 
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1 
on the respondent's parto Second, only one cognizant respondent (Le., the Compensation Director) 
answered the survey from each firmo Costs and time constraints prevented us trom securing 
additional respondents trom each company. Moreover, attempts to match multiple respondents trom 
each firm necessitates dropping the anonymity requirement (which may provoke a sharp drop in the 
retum rate and less candid or biased responses). Finally, there is the potential that exogenous factors 
not controlled for in the study (such as human resource management policies in the areas of staffing, 
training and development, labor relations) may confound the observed findings. Yet, theoretical 
grounding ofthe hypotheses is derived from a long stream ofearlier conceptual and empirical work 
on compensation-organization strategy relations, and this increases our level of confidence in the 
interpretation of results advanced here. 
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TABLE 1 
FIR.~ CRARACTERIS!ICS 
(N - 112) 
Numbe" oi Ernplovees .JL -~-
l. rnder 700 
2. 700-999 
3. 1,000-2499 
4. 2500-9999 
5. 10,000 or more 
16 
23 
16 
32 
25 
14.3 
20.5 
14.3 
28.6 
22.3 
Sales (in rnil1ion) 
1. unce:­ 50 
2. 51-100 
3. 101-150 
4. 151-500 
5. 501 or more 
22 
27 
19 
24 
20 
19.6 
24.1 
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2l.4 
17.9 
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3. Tn:~6 qca=~ile 
4. Bighes~ quartile 
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24 
19 
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l.:fe Cvele 
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2 .. ~ain::e:1a.:1ce 
L9 
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43.8 
56.2 
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2. 20-3% 
3 .. LD-59~ 
.4 óO-79i; 
, SO-99~
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32 
24 
6 
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?O -
- - .:;¡ 
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5. 23~ or more 
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16 
12 
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TABLE 4 
Regression Results Between Control Variables, Business S:rategy, 

Compensa:ion S:rategy, ano ln:eraction Terms (As Predictors) with 

Firm Performance As Depenoent Variable 
(N-112) 
'EP 1 
:1"::-01 Va:-iables 
i=m Size 
,ife Cyele 
.abor Cos: Rat:io 
&.D !nt:ensit)' 
EP 2 
.;o •e ... enoer 
rospee t.o::: 
::1aly.ze::: 
,,:ende:- x Coz::ps 
=ospee=o::: x Co~ps 
,,? :S .OS 
":;' .01:S 
-';l 
.001'. :S 
St.anéa:-o e:::::o:-s éppea::: 
B/SE 
.089/(.124) 
-.826/(.338)* 
. 046/ ( . 117) 
.197/(.09':)* 
-.105/(.131) 
- .140/(.131) 
-.040/(.126) 
.317/(.132)* 
-.299/(.098)** 
.189/(.079)* 
in parent.heses 
Firm Performance 
Beta 
.099 
-.337 
.042 
.221 
I 
.51 
5.96 
.15 
4.24 
Pearson 
Cor:r 
~.234 
-.375 
.190 
.350 .188 
- .111 
-.166 
- .030 
.249 
.64 
1.14 
.10 
5.78 
- .075 
.241 
-.075 
.327 .059 
·.727 
.658 5.74 
.038 
.412 .070 
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TABLE 5 
Means and Standard Deviations of Compensation Strategy 

Scales for Prospectors and Defenders8 

Prospectors 
(N-55) 
~ 5(1 
2.55 1. 23 
3.55 1. 31 
2.64 1. 78 
3.55 1. 28 
3.62 1.34 
2.81 1. 29 
3.52 1.48 
2.74 1.46 
3.12 1.47 
3.52 1.55 
3.47 1.44 
3.44 1. 37 
2.83 1. 37 
3.35 1. 33 
1.19 1. 03 
Compensation Strategy 

Dirnensions 

Basis for Pav 

Job Ettphasis (Scale 1) 

Performance Emphasis (Scale 2) 

Individual Perf. Focus (Scale 3) 

Long Term Orien:ation (Scale 4) 

High Risk Sha~ing (Scale 5) 

!n~e~nal Consistency (Scale 6) 

Eg¿lita~ian Orien~ation (Scale 7) 
Desig;n "Issues 

Lead Ma:::-ket Policy (Scale 8) 

Eigh Incentives (Scale 9) 

M~ltiple Re~ar¿s/High 
r=e~uency (Scale 10) 
Pecunia:::-)' E::l?:'1asis (Scale ll) 
Decen~:::-alize¿ Pay Deels10ns eScale 12) 

High Pay Seeree)" (Scale 13) 

Eigh Par~ieipation (Scale 14) 

Defenders 
(N-45) 
~ So 
3.15 1. 21 
3.42 1.12 
3.30 1. 57 
2.67 1.18 
3.15 1.24 
3.08 1. 22 
3.11 1.13 
3.00 1.18 
2.79 1. 28 
3.08 1. 33 
3.09 1. 36 
3.03 1.28 
3.21 1.14 
2.82 1.14 
.79 .90 
e Prospec:ors anc ¿e~enders are those responclng "4" (Agree) or "S" 
(Strongly Agree) to the eorresponding Miles & Sno~'s seales. 
b 	 Composite is the average oí che 14 scales, a::er each has been weighed 
by che corresponding factor loading. 
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TABLE 6 

Mean Firm Performance Quarti1e for Prospectors and 

Defenders that Fo11ow an A1gorithmic vs. an 

Experientia1 Compensation Strategy8 

Defenders Prospectors 
(N-45) (N-55) 
J..lgorit:hmic 2.41 1.11 1. 65 .99 
0--56 ) 
Experiential 1. 93 1. 28 3.30 .96 
(N-56) 
a Prospect:ors and defenders are -.:hose responcang "4" (Agree) or "5" 
(Strongly Agree) co che corresponding Miles & Sno~'s scales. Those 
belo~ r.he median in -.:he compensa-.:ion sr.rategy composite are designated 
as algoritr~ic ~hile those above the median in that composite are 
designa:ed as experiential. 
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APPENDIX 
Compensation S~rategies: Scales and l~ems 
For each of the follo~ing i~ems, please indicate if you agree using 
~he follo~ing response forma~: 
1 
S~rongly 
Disagree 
2 
Disagree 
3 
Undecided 
4 
Agree 
5 
S'Crongly 
Agree 
1. Job Emphasis (Circle one) 
a) iJe have a job based pa)' system. ihat is, factors 
~ithin the job are key de~er~inants of the amount 
b) 
e) 
oí pa)' received by incumbents. 
~e have a skill based pay system. That is. 
individuals are rewarded in part on their mastery 
oí jon skills. * 
Tne job 1s a more irnportant factor than an incumbent's 
abili-::)' 0= performance in the determination of pay 
=ates in this organization. Heavy emphasis is placed 
on job evaluation procedures to determine pay levels. 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
a) 
b) 
e) 
:ir~ has a strong co~~itment to distribute re~ards 
based on contributions to organization. 
Tnere is a large pa)' spread be':W'een lo...· performers 
anc high pe:::-formers in a given jobo 
r.n enployee' s sen::'ority coes not ente:­ in-:o pa)' 
cecisions. 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
3. !n¿ividual Performance Focus 
1ndi..-idual pe:::-fo:rma':1ce 1s empnasize¿ 
pa)' rathe:::­ than group pe:rforoance. 
as a basis fo:r 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Lon~ 7errr Orientation 
a) 
b) 
7ne pay system has a futuris,:ic orientation. 1t 
focuses enployee's attention on long-term (tW'o or 
~ore years) goals. 
1'he pay system re.....ards employees for short-term 
accomplishments curins a fixed time pe:riod.* 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
3 
4 
4 
5 
HÜ:'h Risl: Sha:-i nfi. 
a) 
b) 
:n chis orga':1ization s port~on of sn employee's 
earni~gs is contingent on g=oup or organiza~ion 
pe:rforDa':1Ce goals being achieved. 
~e ¿esigned our compensation system so chat a 
substantial portion oi our compensation costs 
is variable. 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
3 
4 
4 
5 
5 
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e) Ue believe ~ha: ernployees 
~i:h sorne of their payo 
should be risk ~akers 
1 2 3 4 5 
Internal Consis:encv In Pav Relationships 
a) 
b) 
e) 
ln:ernal pay equi:y is an important goal of our 
pay sys:em. 
Ue try hard to achieve comparable pay relationship 
acrosoS different parts of the orsanization. 
In our organization we give a higher priority to 
internal pay equi:)' than we do to external market 
factors. 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
Egalita=ian Ocien:ation 
a) 
b) 
e) 
Our compensation sys:em reflects a low degree of 
hierarchy. In other words, we try to give a rn~n~rnurn 
of perks (reserved parl~ing spots, 1st class air :ravel, 
etc.) to tOP executives. 
Ye :ry to avoid special pa)' packages and privileges 
as status s)~bo:s to the higher echelons in the 
organiza-::iorl. 
¡';;e rry to rnak-:. our pe)' syst:ern as egalitarian as 
possible. There are ver)' :e~ perks or special rewards 
available to any "elite" groups of employees. 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
Lea¿ Market Comnensation Policv 
a) 
b) 
Pre:erred position o: organiza-::ion's salary levels 
.... :. -::h respect to compe-::i :o::s i5 clearly above market. 
Pre:erre¿ pos:'tion o: 0::ganization'5 benefits level 
•...·:..tn respee: :0 eompe:itors is elearly a':love rnarke-::. 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
3 
4 
4 
5 
5 
lo!' •
•. ::. '!Z!'1 !nce:i::ives 
a) 
b) 
e) 
e) 
e) 
f) 
Tne base salary 15 no: an impor-::ant part o: the total 
compensation package. 
Toe base salar)' ls lo...· rela-::ive to o:her forms of pey 
-:::ha::: an ern?loyee ma)' receive in this organiza-::ion. 
Tne bene:its are no: an important part of the total 
pay package. 
'¡he employee benefits package i5 not ver)' generous 
compared ~nat it coul¿ be. 
Pe)' ine~ntive5 such as a bonus or profit sharing 
are an ir.lportar.-.:: par-.:: o: the compensation st::rai:egy 
~~ th~s orgaDization. 
?ay :':"lcen-::i\'es a::::-€ desig':"led to provide a significan'!: 
a.":l0·":':"l-':: o: ':':1 er:.ployee' s total earnings in this 
o:-gé..nizatio:1 .. 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
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10. Mu'l tiple Re...·ards IHi gh Freguencv 
Multiplere'lo.1ards are provided frequently; frequency 
of raises is ,\Tie'lo.1ed as more important than the actual 
size of che raise. 1 2 3 4 5 
11. Pecunia'!"v Emphasis 
a) 
b) 
Compensation plays a dominant role in the human 
resource strategy of the firmo 
Compensation is used as a critical tool to signal 
as 'Io.1ell as to support organizational change. 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
3 
4 
4 
5 
5 
12. Decen;ralization Pav Pensions 
a) 
b) 
c) 
Pay policy is not centralized in this organization. 
The Personnel staff in each divisionjbusiness unit has 
freedom to develop its o~~ compensation programs. we 
recognize the fact that jobs ~ithin the firm are 
fle:üble ano change often and that err.ployee exchanges 
and transiers are corr~on. 
There is a minimum of interference from corporate 
neadquarters ~ith respect to pay decisions made by 
line managers. 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
"".l F.i~h Pa'" Sec':."ecv 
es) 
b) 
e) 
1:e keep pay ir.formation secret frore the employees. 
'l..:'e have :o':."mal polic ies that cllscourage err.ployees 
::::::on: c.h"Ulging their pay to coworke:-s. 
Ou:: organization does not. openly disclose the 
ad=lnist::::ative proceoures on how pay levels and 
pay raises a::::e established. 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
a) 
b) 
e) 
Em?loyees' feelings ano p:-eferences for various 
pay forrr.s (e.g., bonus .....s. profit sharing) .are 
taken very seriously by t.op management.. 
!-:.any diffe::::ent kinds o: employees ( individual 
contributo::::s, reanage:-s, Personnel staff. executives) 
nave a say 1n pay policies. 
Pay decisions in this org.anizat.ion are seldom made 
on an autoc:-atic basis. Employees have input to 
pay éecisions and performance evaluat.ions. 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
=~ese :te~s a~e reverse scoreo. 
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